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THE THEORY, HISTORY, AND PRACTICE OF THE
BRIBERY-EXTORTION DISTINCTION
JAMES LINDGRENt
In the law of blackmail and extortion, two topics have generated
great debates: the paradox of blackmail and the bribery-extortion
distinction. The paradox debate has so far been more theoretical
than practical or historical, while the bribery-extortion debate has
been more practical and historical than theoretical. In this Article,
I will first examine the theoretical overlap of bribery and extortion.
Next, I will try to tie together the paradox debate and the bribery-
extortion debate. As I see it, the same principle that underlies
bribery underlies public official extortion and blackmail. That is
part of what has made extortion and bribery so difficult to distin-
guish. Then I will analyze the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence
of extortion and answer some of the historical questions raised by
the sharp exchange between Justices Stevens and Thomas over my
work.
I. THE THEORY OF THE BRIBERY-EXTORTION DISTINCTION
A. The Definitions of Bribeiy and Extortion
Extortion is of two types: extortion by threats or fear and
extortion under color of office. Extortion by threats or fear
(coercive extortion) can refer to any illegal use of a threat or fear to
obtain property or advantages from another, short of violence that
would be robbery.1 Statutes usually set out the kinds of threats or
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fear that make up extortion-for example, the threat to commit a
crime, injure person or property, expose a crime, or expose
contemptible information. 2 Coercive extortion is often called
blackmail, particularly where hush money is involved, but few
blackmail statutes remain on the books. Usually, blackmail behavior
is covered under extortion, theft, or coercion statutes.3 If public
officials or threats of physical violence are involved, the term
extortion is more commonly used than blackmail in ordinary
speech.
The debate over the bribery-extortion distinction has centered
on the second type of extortion-extortion under color of office.
Historically, extortion under color of office is the seeking or receipt
of a corrupt payment by a public official (or a pretended public
official) because of his office or his ability to influence official
action.4 Bribery is a corrupt benefit given or received to influence
official action.
5
In England and the United States, the primary public corruption
offense over most of the last 700 years has been extortion, though
in recent years bribery prosecutions appear to be at least as
common. As an offense called bribery, this crime probably
appeared relatively late (mid-1500s) 6 and may not have been
routinely applied to administrative officials until the 1800s.7
CODE § 223.4 (1962) (defining theft by extortion).
2 See James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM L. REV. 670,
673 & nn.20-22 (1984) (giving examples of the most commonly prohibited threats).
3 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-25 (1982) (coercion); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.530
(1989) (coercion); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13208 (Michie 1987) (coercion); id. §§ 5-36-
102 to -103 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991) (theft); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-192
(West 1985) (coercion); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 16-1 (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp.
1992) (theft); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-5 (West 1982) (coercion); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 135.60 (McKinney 1987) (coercion); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-06 (1985)
(coercion); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.12 (Anderson 1987) (coercion); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 22-30A-4 (1988) (theft); MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (1962)
(theft by extortion); id. § 212.5 (criminal coercion).
4 See James Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From
the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. REV. 815, 825 (1988).
5 See id. at 824. In lay terms, the influence is in one direction: to afford the giver
better than fair treatment.
6 Noonan's account of bribery is completely unclear about when the crime of
bribery arose in England. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES (1984) (providing a
history of bribery-type offenses from 3000 B.C. to 1984). References to bribery cases
in Star Chamber records start appearing in about 1550. See id. at 315.
7 Noonan counts the impeachment of Warren Hastings, an eighteenth century
governor of the British colony of Bengal, India, as the first clear administrative
bribery case, but it's really an extortion case. See id. at 392-424, 579 (giving a
biography of Warren Hastings and describing the acts that led to his impeachment
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Obviously, there was always a need to punish bribery-type behavior
by public officials. Continuously since the 1200s, extortion has met
that need.
One sees much the same kind of public corruption case in the
late 1200s'as in modern cases in the federal courts. Then, as now,
extortion has usually embraced takings by coercion, false pretenses,
or bribery.8 Bribery and extortion substantially overlap and have
for centuries. In the late nineteenth century and the first half of the
twentieth century, many American courts attempted to separate the
two crimes, sometimes even claiming that the two crimes were
mutually exclusive. 9 Nonetheless, even during this period, there
remained a substantial line of cases, consistent with the earlier and
later cases, holding that the two crimes could be committed on the
same facts-indeed, even affirming bribery and extortion convictions
for the same transaction.10 Under modern Hobbs Act11 jurispru-
dence, the overlap has been baldly admitted: "extortion 'under
color of official right' equals the knowing receipt of bribes."
12
trial). I am in some doubt on this point because I found one 1600 case involving a
constable that appears to be a bribery case, but the report mayjust be describing the
behavior rather than the crime. See Rigge (1600), in YORKSHIRE ARCHAEOLOGICAL
AND TOPOGRAPHICAL ASS'N, 3 RECORD SERIES, 2 WEST RIDING SESSIONS ROLLs 1597-
1602, at 207 (J. Lister ed. 1888) (stating that constable "levied more soldiers for
musters than were required, and after by the way agreed with some of them for
bribes and turned the men home again").
8 See Lindgren, supra note 4, at 848-62.
9 See People v. Feld, 28 N.Y.S.2d 796, 797-98 (App. Div. 1941) (holding that
bribery of a labor official and coercive extortion are mutually exclusive; official right
extortion wasn't under prosecution).
10 See Martin v. United States, 278 F. 913 (2d Cir. 1922) (involving visa officer
convicted of both bribery and official extortion for taking $30 "grease" payment to
speed up processing); State v. Vallee, 12 A.2d 421 (Me. 1940) (holding shakedown of
public janitor by county commissioner to be both extortion by fear and bribery);
People v. Hansen, 150 N.E. 542 (N.Y. 1925) (per curiam) (upholding convictions for
both bribery and extortion under color of official right on the same facts, despite
defendant's argument that the two crimes were mutually exclusive).
11 See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988).
12 United States v. Holzer, 840 F.2d 1343, 1351 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1035 (1988). See United States v. Butler, 618 F.2d 411, 418 (6th Cir.) ("[A] showing
that the motivation for the payment focuses on the recipient's office, regardless of
who induces the payments, is sufficient to convict under the Hobbs Act."), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 927 (1980) ; United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139, 151 (7th Cir. 1974) ("So
long as the motivation for the payment focuses on the recipient's office, the conduct
falls within the ambit of [the Hobbs Act]."), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); see also
Christine Dibble, Note, Reevaluating the Application of the Hobbs Act to Public Officials,
3 J.L. POL. 387, 395 (1986) (noting that courts have found that bribery "cannot
successfully be asserted as a defense to a Hobbs Act charge"); James P. Fleissner,
Comment, Prosecuting Public Officials Under the Hobbs Act: Inducement as an Element of
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This old common law tradition has been recently adopted by the
United States Supreme Court in Evans v. United States.
13
A persistent question remains: What is the difference between
bribery and extortion? I will try to distinguish the terms in ordinary
speech. Nonlawyers tend to think of extortion as necessarily
coercive. Thus I will first try to distinguish bribery from coercive
extortion by public officials.
B. The Ordinary-Language Distinction Between
Bribery and Coercive Extortion
1. Refining the Lay Definitions
First, when a briber corruptly pays off a public official, he is
paying to get some result for himself or those he favors. He is
seeking preferential treatment. This preference may be substantial-
for example, changing a losing bidder into a winner. Or it may be
slight-for example, increasing the chances that a probably meritori-
ous bidder will win. Nevertheless, a briber is not just paying to
influence official behavior, he is paying to influence action in his
favor.
14
Second, even someone who is paying to influence official
behavior in his favor may not be acting corruptly if he is merely
buying back fair treatment from an official who threatens to inflict
unfair treatment. Although the morality of giving in to a coercive
extortion threat has been debated for centuries, 15 capitulating is
often not illegal. 16 Many people would not consider it bribery for
Extortion Under Color of Official Right, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1066, 1073-74 (1985) ("The
mere acceptance of an unsolicited bribe constitutes extortion under color of official
right."); Note, Limiting Expansion into Public Corruption Under the Hobbs Act: United
States v. O'Grady, 18 CONN. L. REv. 183, 185-90 (1985).
13 See Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881 (1992).
14 See, e.g., Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribety and the Intermediate Theory of
Politics, 32 UCLA L. REv. 784, 825 (1985) ("The briber influences the official if the
gift increases the probability that the official will act as the briber hopes.").
15 See, e.g., RICHARD BAXTER, A CHRISTIAN DIRECTORY, OR A SUMMA OF
PRACTICAL THEOLOGIE, AND CASES OF CONSCIENCE 4,116 (1673), quoted in NOONAN,
supra note 6, at 388-89; 3 PIERRE LE CHANTRE, SUMMA DE SACRAMENTIS ET ANIMAE
CONSILIS 2a, 3, 35-36 (Jean-Albert Duguaquier ed., 1954) (late 12th century), quoted
in NOONAN, supra note 6, at 176.
16 The Model Penal Code, however, makes it bribery to capitulate to an extortion
threat. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.1 (1962) (defining bribery in official and
political matters); MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 240.1 cmt. 2 (1980)
(discussing omission of word "corrupt" from the definition of bribery); id. at cmt. 10
(discussing denial of the extortion defense to bribery).
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a citizen to pay off a public official who is forcing the citizen to buy
back what ought to be his for free.1 7 If a citizen is paying only to
buy fair treatment and nothing more, he is the victim of extortion
and has not committed bribery according to its general lay concep-
tion. Bribery usually is thought to consist of paying for better than
fair treatment.
Thus, the lay definition of bribery can be restated: bribery is a
corrupt benefit given or received to influence official action so as
to afford the giver better than fair treatment. Both the person
giving and the person receiving the benefit are guilty of bribery.
18
And, indeed, this reciprocity is a characteristic of most bribery
situations. When bribery occurs, the payor usually makes a payment
that is corrupt for him to make. Such a corrupt payment is one that
unfairly distorts official decisionmaking. Because people don't pay
unless they expect to get something they want, the distortion will
almost invariably be in favor of the payor or his friends. Thus,
unless the payor is trying to gain an unfair advantage, he is usually
viewed as the victim of official extortion and is not considered guilty
of bribery.
In my view, coercive extortion by a public official is the seeking
or receiving of a corrupt benefit paid under an implicit or explicit
threat to give the payor worse than fair treatment or to make the
payor worse off than he is now or worse than he expects to be. The
payee is guilty of extortion; the payor is the victim of extortion.
This kind of coercion constitutes the modern lay conception of
extortion by public officials. Thus, while bribery has only one
baseline (fair treatment), coercive extortion has at least three
baselines (fair treatment, expected treatment, and the status quo).
17 However, if the payor is paying to fix a case, for example, the relevant question
is not whether he would have won his case, but whether he is paying for more than
fair treatment. If he is paying the judge or public official to win his case whatever the
merits might be-to make a probability of victory into a certainty-it would still be a
corrupt payment for both the payor and the public official. On the morality of
buying back what ought to be yours for free, see NOONAN, supra note 6, at 176
(reporting that, in 1191-1192, Le Chantre asked whether one may morally buy back
a right but that he does not answer the question; instead he suggests that an
exemplary man would refuse to capitulate); see also id. at 178-79 (reporting that
Thomas of Chobham in the early thirteenth century wrote that it's not sinful "to buy
back one's own right from a judge when one cannot otherwise have it" and that a
litigant receives "nothing from the judge except what is his own or what is owed to
him.").
18 See Rex v. Vaughan, 98 Eng. Rep. 308, 311 (K.B. 1769) (Mansfield, L.)
("Wherever it is a crime to take, it is a crime to give: they are reciprocal.").
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For example, it's extortion if a public official threatens to deny
a public contract to a bidding contractor who clearly deserves to
receive it unless the bidder pays off the official. The official would
receive the payoff under a threat to give the contractor worse than
fair treatment. The contractor would not have done anything wrong
since he was forced to buy back only what he deserved in the first
place. On the other hand, it would be bribery if a clearly unquali-
fied contractor paid off the official to get the contract. Here, the
contractor would be paying to get better than fair treatment. Thus
he, along with the public official, would be guilty of bribery.
Situations like this are on the minds of the public when the words
"bribery" and "extortion" are used.
2. The Overlap of Bribery and Coercive Extortion
by Public Officials
Even as I have stated their lay conceptions, bribery and
extortion overlap. In most payoff situations, we won't clearly know
who actually deserved to get a public contract. 9 Usually, the
official makes the bidder aware that he won't get the contract unless
he pays off the official, and if the bidder pays, he will definitely get
the contract. Fair treatment would consist of the bidder being given
a fair chance against all other bidders, but that is usually not a
realistic option in payoff cases. If the bidder doesn't pay, he gets
less than fair treatment (coercive extortion). If he pays, he gets
more than fair treatment (bribery). Thus the same envelope filled
with cash can be both a payment extorted under a threat of unfairly
negative treatment and a bribe obtained under a promise of unfairly
positive treatment. This is one common situation where bribery and
extortion overlap, even if one limits extortion only to its lay
conception as coercion. Unless a legislature clearly indicates
otherwise, there is no reason to let off a briber just because he was
also a victim of extortion. If we were to let the briber off, he could
continue to cheat the public and other bidders, safe in the knowl-
19 The forms of pressure are subtle. See Charles F.C. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of
Local Corruption: A Case Study in the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. L.J.
1171, 1177 (1977) (stating that "prosecutors... encountered a level of sophistication
in the making and receiving of illicit payments which promised substantial difficulty
in establishing the commission of extortion by duress"); HerbertJ. Stern, Prosecutions
of Local Political Corruption Under the Hobbs Act: The Unnecessat Distinction Between
Bribery and Extortion, 3 SETON HALL L. REv. 1, 6 (1971) (noting that "a local official
may not even need to solicit the kickback, much less demand it") (emphasis omitted).
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edge that the official was corrupt enough to refuse him a fair
chance without a payoff.
20
A second common situation where bribery and coercive
extortion overlap is where a public official explicitly or implicitly
threatens to make the victim worse off than she is now, but no
worse than the victim deserves to be. I can illustrate this situation
best by starting with coercive extortion by private citizens. It's
extortion if a private citizen threatens to have a criminal arrested
unless the criminal pays hush money to the private citizen. This is
true even though the criminal is paying to avoid a harm that
arguably deserves to be inflicted on her-arrest.
It's also extortion if the citizen has a legal duty to turn in the
criminal. For instance, under federal law we all have a duty to
report people who commit federal felonies.21 Yet it would still be
extortion for a private citizen to threaten to report a federal felon
unless he is paid off, despite the threatener's breach of his legal
duty to report.
22
Now what about government officials who have a duty to arrest
criminals? Here coercive extortion and bribery overlap. If a police
officer suggests that he will not arrest a criminal if he is paid off,
this is extortion, 2 because he is threatening to make the criminal
worse off than he is now. But it's also bribery,24 because the
criminal is paying hush money for more than fair treatment. Police
officers who take protection or hush money from drug dealers,
liquor law violators, or prostitutes commit extortion just as much as
a private citizen would for taking the same protection money. Yet
it's classic bribery for public officials to take routine payments not
20 The threat of the loss of a contract would usually not be sufficient duress to
exculpate a defendant from criminal liability under the general principles of the
duress defense. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1962) (defining the affirmative
defense of duress).
21 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1988) (misprision of felony).
22 See United States v. Smith, 228 F. Supp. 345, 348 (E.D. La. 1964) (holding that
a threat to expose a company's fraud on government contracts, a federal felony,
unless the company rehired specific persons is sufficient to indict defendant for
blackmail).
23 See, e.g., United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139, 151 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 910 (1975) (holding defendant police officers guilty of extortion for "taking
money to refrain from their duties"); Ellwyn R. Stoddard, Blue-Coat Crime, in 2 CRIME
& JUSTICE 194 (Leon Radzinowicz & Marvin E. Wolfgang eds., 1971) (defining
extortion).
24 See 11 C.J.S. Bribery § 2e(3) (1938) ("[R]eceipt by an authorized officer, of a
bribe to release one from arrest is criminal without regard to the legality of the
arrest."); Stoddard, supra note 23 (defining bribery).
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to enforce the law. Indeed, if a police officer suggested to a
prostitute that he might forget about arresting her if she paid him
off every week, it would be difficult to say if it would be more
common to characterize the behavior 25 as extortion or the solicita-
tion of a bribe.
A related situation of overlap is in the bribery of a witness.
Assume that a potential witness offers not to testify about a crime
if paid off or, to state it differently, threatens to testify unless paid
off. If an accused criminal pays to suppress the testimony, the
potential witness has committed both extortion and bribery. He has
committed coercive extortion by threatening to make the criminal
worse off than he is now (but no worse than the criminal deserves
to be). He has committed bribery since he has accepted a payment
that will give the payor more than fair treatment. A good example
of this situation is Howard Hunt's request for large sums of money
to keep quiet about Watergate. Judge John Noonan in his book,
Bribes, calls this behavior bribery,26 but Nixon and most writers at
the time called it blackmail, 27 a synonym for extortion.
C. The Voluntay-Coercive Distinction and the
Initiation-Passive Receipt Distinction
A myriad of other distinctions have been offered for the
difference between bribery and extortion. None of these have been
clearly worked out in a way that would allow sustained analysis.
Some of these beliefs are widely held by the general public and by
academics, but they usually collapse when applied to particular
situations.
None of the simplistic distinctions that might spring to mind can
adequately capture the subtleties of the situation or keep bribery
and extortion separate. First, one can't say that extortion is
initiated by the public official, while bribery is initiated by the
citizen. A public official may initiate bribery if he anticipates that
the citizen would be willing to pay to get unwarranted public
25 See, e.g., Stoddard, supra note 23 (defining types of police misbehavior: (1)
extortion as "'street courts' where minor traffic tickets can be avoided by the payment
of cash bail to the arresting officer with no receipt required," and (2) bribery as '[tihe
payments of cash or 'gifts' for past or future assistance to avoid prosecution").
26 See NOONAN, supra note 6, at 583 ("Bribery was ... at the core of the hard
evidence set out against him [Nixon].").
2 See, e.g., THEODORE H. WHITE, BREACH OF FAITH: THE FALL OF RICHARD
NIXON 198-99,200,203,326 (1975); BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNsTEIN, THE FINAL
DAYs 50, 56, 89-92 (1976).
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benefits. This initiation is what is meant by the crime of "soliciting
a bribe,"28 where the public official almost invariably takes the first
step. Many, if not most, bribery statutes punish the asking for a
bribe as bribery or attempted bribery. Indeed, in the most copied
nineteenth century criminal code, the 1881 New York Field Code,
the method of taking for extortion under color of official right was
the same as for bribery-asking, receiving, or agreeing to receive.
29
Nor is extortion always initiated by the official. Even if extortion
were limited to coercion (which it isn't), a citizen may begin
discussing extortion if she correctly anticipates that she can't get fair
treatment without making a payoff.
Another distinction that fails is the claim that extortion is
coercive while bribery is voluntary. Since early common law,
extortion by public officials has included receiving unwarranted
payments-whether by coercion, false pretenses, or bribery.30 But
even if we limited extortion to coercive extortion, the distinction
wouldn't completely separate the two crimes. Their overlap is best
illustrated by the examples raised earlier. If a private citizen takes
hush money from a prostitute, she commits extortion, which is
considered coercive. If, however, a public official takes hush money
from the same prostitute, he commits bribery as well as extortion.
Does the prostitute pay the public official voluntarily while she pays
28 See, e.g., Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 485 (1984) (stating that
petitioners sought bribes and used their positions to "extract ... [money] in
kickbacks"; therefore, they are guilty of violating the federal bribery statute); United
States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1247 (2d Cir. 1978) (affirming conviction of meat
inspector for receiving money; case assumes that a bribe could be solicited); In re
Bloom, 561 P.2d 258, 261 (Cal. 1977) (holding that the defendant's "solicitation of
a... bribe for purposes of personal gain ... shows he was... unfit to practice law");
People v. Fujita, 43 Cal. Ct. App. 3d 454 (1974) (defendants acquitted of solicitation
of bribery), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964 (1975); Englander v. State, 246 So. 2d 746, 747
(Fla.) (defendant charged with conspiracy to solicit a bribe and soliciting a bribe), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971); In re Gottlieb, 486 N.E.2d 921, 922 (Ill. 1985) (denying
reinstatement to attorney after disbarment following payments to state officials who
solicited bribes); In re Holovachka, 198 N.E.2d 381, 391 (Ind. 1964) (stating that
defendant "attempted to solicit a bribe from a local official"), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
974 (1965); Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 275 N.E.2d 33, 42 (Mass. 1971)
(involving defendants charged with numerous offenses in connection with the
solicitation of numerous bribes), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 910 (1972).
29 Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 557 (1881) (extortion: "asks, or receives, or agrees
to receive") with id. § 45 ("[a]n executive officer.., who asks, receives, or agrees to
receive any bribe"); and id. § 67 ("member of... the legislature of this state, who
asks, receives, or agrees to receive any bribe"); and id. § 72 ("judicial officer... who
asks, receives, or agrees to receive a bribe").
So See Lindgren, supra note 4, at 838-905 (explaining the evolution of extortion).
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the citizen only under coercion? The prostitute's fear would seem
to be the same in both cases-exposure and prosecution. It's true
that the official would be breaching his duty to enforce the law, but
this doesn't make the payment any less coercive to the prostitute.
And as I have pointed out earlier, the citizen may also be breaching
her legal duty to report the prostitute.3 1 Whether a threat to
enforce the law is coercive doesn't depend on the legal duty of the
threatener.
II. WHAT MAKES BRIBERY CORRUPT?
A look at the first English bribery statute and the first English
extortion statute show them to have the same idea at bottom-and
on top as well. According to the first English statute that was later
considered to be a bribery statute, judges may not take any "robe,
fee, pension, gift, nor reward of any but the King, except reward of
meat and drink, which shall be no great value."32 It was in force
from 1384 through 1881. This statute's language is similar to the
First Statute of Westminster, the main English extortion statute
from 1275 through 1968. Among its many extortion provisions,
Westminster I provided: "no Sheriff, or other officer of the King,
shall take any Reward to do his Office, but shall be paid of what he
takes of the King."33 The language is almost identical, the chief
difference being the kind of officer covered. As these early statutes
illustrate, the wrong of both crimes was then clearly focused on the
acquisitive uses that can be put to state power, rather than the
distortion of official decisionmaking.
Bribery is corrupt for two reasons: (1) it involves a public
official using his office to gain advantages from citizens; and (2) it
often distorts the underlying official action. The second concern
may be secondary in importance as well. First, although there is
some disagreement, bribery may be committed even where the
official takes the proper official action, because he has used his
office improperly for personal gain. Judge John Noonan even cites
31 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
32 8 Rich. 2, c. 3 (1384), (repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 44 & 45 Vict.,
c. 59 (1881)) (based on 18 Edw. 3, stat. 4 (1344) (oath ofjustices)); see also 3 ENG.
HIsT. Doc. 369 (H. Rothwell ed., 1975) (Royal Proclamation of Oct. 20, 1258).
33 Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw. 1, c. 26 (1275) (translated from the Latin by
author) (repealed byTheftAct, 1968, c. 60, § 33(3), sched. 3, and Statute Law Reform
Act, 26 & 27 Vict., c. 125 (1863)); Lindgren, supra note 4, at 841-48 (discussing
origins of statute and its other extortion provisions).
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two literary examples where an official is "double-damned because
he takes a bribe and does not act upon it. "34 Second, as just
illustrated, bribery arose as an offense in English law primarily in
contexts suggesting concern for how officials acquire wealth. 5
The concern seemed to be greedy officials, rather than powerful
subjects distorting government.
Standard moral and economic accounts of the theory of bribery
argue that it's a misuse of agency. In Corruption, Susan Rose-
Ackerman sees legislators as agents for plural principals who take
bribes to advance their self-interest at the possible expense of the
interests of their principals.3 6 In Bribes, Judge Noonan argues:
The notion of fidelity in office, as old as Cicero, is inextricably
bound to the concept of public interest distinct from private
advantage. It is beyond debate that officials of the government are
relied upon to act for the public interest not their own enrich-
ment.
When government officials act to enrich themselves they act
against the fabric on which they depend, for what else does
government rest upon except the expectation that those chosen to
act for the public welfare will serve that welfare?
3 7
Thus, the exploitation of public power for personal gain is an
important justification for a law against bribery. An official
accepting a bribe is using public leverage, the leverage of the
government or the public, to make deals for his personal benefit.
This is the same principle that I have identified as underlying
blackmail. I have argued:
Let us first examine informational blackmail. Here the
blackmailer threatens to tell others damaging information about
the blackmail victim unless the victim heeds the blackmailer's
request, usually a request for money. The blackmailer obtains
what he wants by using extra leverage. But that leverage belongs
more to a third person than to the blackmailer. The blackmail
victim pays the blackmailer to avoid involving third parties; he
34 NOONAN, supra note 6, at 697 (citing Angelo in MEASURE FOR MEASURE and
Hog in Cicero's literary classic).
5 See Lindgren, supra note 4, at 873-75.
6 See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 211
(1978) (noting that "[t]he problem of corruption... indicates that competition of
self-interested actors may... be used to subvert democratic processes and prevent
the implementation of legislative decisions").
37 NOONAN, supra note 6, at 704.
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pays to avoid being harmed by persons other than the blackmailer.
When the reputation of a person is damaged, he is punished by all
those who change their opinion of him. They may "punish" him
by treating him differently or he may be punished merely by the
knowledge that others no longer respect him.
Thus when a blackmailer threatens to turn in a criminal unless
paid money, the blackmailer is bargaining with the state's chip.
The blackmail victim pays to avoid the harm that the state would
inflict; he pays because he believes that he can thereby suppress
the state's potential criminal claim. Of course, this does not effect
a legally binding settlement, but the leverage is effective precisely
to the extent that the victim believes that he has reached an
effective settlement. Likewise, when a blackmailer threatens to
expose damaging but noncriminal behavior unless paid money, he
is also turning third-party leverage to his own benefit. What
makes his conduct blackmail is that he interposes himself parasiti-
cally in an actual or potential dispute in which he lacks a suffi-
ciently direct interest. What right has he to make money by
settling other people's claims?
At the heart of blackmail, then, is the triangular nature of the
transaction, and particularly this disjunction between the black-
mailer's personal benefit and the interests of the third parties
whose leverage he uses. In effect, the blackmailer attempts to gain
an advantage in return for suppressing someone else's actual or
potential interest. The blackmailer is negotiating for his own gain
with someone else's leverage or bargaining chips.
This misuse of another's leverage is perhaps seen most clearly
in noninformational blackmail, in situations where a formal agency
relationship exists-for instance, where a labor union leader
threatens to cause a strike unless he is given a personal payoff.
There the labor leader is turning group power and a group dispute
to personal benefit. The pressure on the blackmail victim would
be the same if the blackmailer's agency relationship were merely
informal-for instance, where an influential businessman threatens
to cause a strike unless he is given a personal payoff. Notice that
the victim of blackmail probably does not care whether the
threatener is a labor leader or an influential businessman, an
authorized agent or an unauthorized one. What the victim fears
is a strike. Whoever seeks a personal payoff by credibly wielding
the power of a third party to harm the victim is a blackmailer.
The same misuse of representative or agency power can be
seen where someone threatens to deny a public contract unless the
contractor makes a payoff. Again, it doesn't matter much to the
victim whether the threatener is a government official or an
influential citizen, a formal representative or an informal one.
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Both would be turning group power to personal benefit, offering
to suppress a potential interest of the government and the public
for personal gain.
What emerges from these examples is the observation that
blackmail is the misuse of an informal (or formal) power of agency
or representation. Under my theory, blackmail is the seeking of
an advantage by threatening to press an actual or potential dispute
that is primarily between the blackmail victim and someone else.
The blackmailer threatens to bring others into the dispute but
typically asks for something for himself; he turns someone else's
power, usually group power, to personal benefit. The bargaining
is unfair in that the threatener uses leverage that is less his than
someone else's.38
My theory has been correctly identified as an exploitation
theory.39 This same theory of exploiting other people's interests
for personal gain probably underlies other controversial areas of law
besides blackmail and bribery-including payola (disc jockeys
receiving personal payoffs to influence their decisions in ways that
may not benefit their employers or audiences), insider trading
(private information used for personal gain that must be used, if at
all, after disclosure to the general public), and commercial bribery
(purchasing agents or other company officials use company leverage
for personal gain).
All of these areas-bribery, blackmail, payola, insider trading,
and commercial bribery-share problems of determining underlying
entitlements to the leverage being used. For example, if a legislator
agrees in part in return for a large campaign contribution that he
will choose a chief of staff that the contributor can work with, has
he used public leverage for personal benefit? Or is the choice of a
chief of staff personal enough (even though the staffer is on the
government payroll) that it wouldn't be bribery (or extortion) to
make the promise to the contributor?
It's notoriously difficult to separate bribery (or extortion) from
gifts, tips, campaign contributions, and log-rolling.40  That one
doesn't have a good theory to explain the entitlements isn't a
refutation of either of the important principles underlying bribery-
that bribery is based on exploiting other people's leverage and that
m Lindgren, supra note 2, at 702-03 (emphasis and citations omitted).
39 See JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL LAw: HARMLESS
WRONGDOING 239-40 (1988) (defining theory as an "exploitation principle").
4 0 See NOONAN, supra note 6, at 687-90 (arguing that it is impossible, in many
instances, to distinguish a bribe from a gift, tip, or campaign contribution).
1707
1708 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:1695
the line between corrupt and noncorrupt bargains should be drawn
according to the degree to which there is a disjunction between
individual benefit and group leverage.
III. RECENT SUPREME COURT EXTORTION CASES:
MCCORMICK AND EVANS
After nearly two decades of dodging federal Hobbs Act
extortion cases, the United States Supreme Court has finally taken
up some of the issues that have created splits between the circuits.
First, in McCormick v. United States,41 the Supreme Court held that
there was a requirement of an explicit quid pro quo in official
extortion cases involving campaign contributions. Then, in Evans
v. United States,42 the Court held that (1) there's no requirement
of inducement for official extortion; (2) official extortion doesn't
require coercion; (3) bribery isn't a defense to extortion; (4) official
extortion isn't limited to false pretenses; and (5) the Government
"need only show that a public official has obtained a payment to
which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in
return for official acts."
43
A. McCormick v. United States
Robert L. McCormick was a West Virginia legislator. He turned
the shortage of doctors in West Virginia to his own benefit, making
himself the legislative champion of graduates of foreign medical
schools who wanted to practice medicine even after repeatedly
failing the state licensing exams. In 1984, McCormick sponsored
legislation that gave a one-year extension to a program that allowed
the foreign doctors to practice while they were trying to pass.44 In
May of that year, during McCormick's campaign for re-election, he
had an "unfriendly" conversation with the lobbyist for the foreign
doctors, saying that "he had not heard anything from the foreign
doctors."45 Shortly thereafter the lobbyist produced an envelope
containing $900 in cash, and gave McCormick another $2000 later
that day.46 Other large cash payments were made during the
41 111 S. Ct. 1807, 1817 (1991).
42 112 S. Ct. 1881 (1992).
43 Id. at 1889 (citation omitted).
4 McCormick, 111 S. Ct. at 1809-10.
45 Id. at 1810.
46 Id. The maximum donation from any one person allowed under state law was
fifty dollars. Id. at 1810 n.1; see also W. VA. CODE § 3-8-5d (1990).
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campaign. In 1985, after re-election, McCormick sponsored
legislation that permitted experienced doctors to be permanently
licensed without passing the state licensing exams. The foreign
doctors then made another cash payoff, long after the campaign was
over. None of these payments were reported by McCormick or by
the doctors' organization as campaign contributions, nor did
McCormick report them on his personal tax returns.
47
McCormick was convicted of extortion and income tax evasion.
His conviction was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, 48 but reversed in a 6-3 decision by the Supreme Court for
which Justice White wrote the majority opinion.49 Justice Scalia
wrote a concurrence that didn't discuss the issues raised by the case;
rather, he discussed some of the other disputed issues in Hobbs Act
jurisprudence that he thought the Court should take up in the
future.50 Justice Stevens wrote a vigorous dissent.
51
1. Justice White's Majority Opinion in McCormick
As to McCormick's explicit quid pro quo requirement where
campaign contributions are involved, Justice White's argument is
neither textual nor historical. Rather, it's a pragmatic and logical
argument:
Serving constituents and supporting legislation that will
benefit the district and individuals and groups therein is the
everyday business of a legislator. It is also true that campaigns
must be run and financed. Money is constantly being solicited on
behalf of candidates, who run on platforms and who claim support
on the basis of their views and what they intend to do or have
done. Whatever ethical considerations and appearances may
indicate, to hold that legislators commit the federal crime of
extortion when they act for the benefit of constituents or support
legislation furthering the interests of some of their constituents,
shortly before or after campaign contributions are solicited and
received from those beneficiaries, is an unrealistic assessment of
what Congress could have meant by making it a crime to obtain
property from another, with his consent, "under color of official
right." To hold otherwise would open to prosecution not only
47 See McCormick, 111 S. Ct. at 1810.
48 McCormick v. United States, 896 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1990).
49 McCormick, 111 S. Ct. at 1809-18.
50 See id. at 1818-20.
-5 I won't comment on justice Stevens's opinions at this point; I prefer to examine
his views in the context of his majority opinion in Evans. See infra part III.B.
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conduct that has long been thought to be well within the law but
also conduct that in a very real sense is unavoidable so long as
election campaigns are financed by private contributions or
expenditures, as they have been from the beginning of the Nation.
It would require statutory language more explicit than the Hobbs
Act contains to justify a contrary conclusion.
52
Justice White concludes:
This is not to say that it is impossible for an elected official to
commit extortion in the course of financing an election campaign.
Political contributions are of course vulnerable if induced by the
use of force, violence, or fear. The receipt of such contributions
is also vulnerable under the Act as having been taken under color
of official right, but only if the payments are made in return for
an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or
not to perform an official act. In such situations the official
asserts that his official conduct will be controlled by the terms of
the promise or undertaking. This is the receipt of money by an
elected official under color of official right within the meaning of
the Hobbs Act.
53
It appears that Justice White was concerned about either the unjust
conviction of public officials for innocent campaign contributions
or the chilling effect on campaign financing. He doesn't give any
examples of the pre-existing law being too vigorously applied.
Indeed, I can't think of a single case in which a conviction for
extortion has withstood challenge when the official acted properly
and the court applied the usual common law rule requiring that the
official taking be wrongful or corrupt. Certainly, even Congress
can't claim that the pre-existing law chilled too many large contribu-
tions. If we ask whether we have too little influence peddling in the
context of campaign finances, too much influence peddling, or an
optimal amount, I think everyone thinks that we have too much. So
over-deterrence isn't a problem.
54
What is obviously motivating Justice White is overbreadth
concerns. He is worried that large campaign contributions are
seldom without hope of some help. He, in effect, argues:
1. Either we have an explicit quid pro quo requirement or routine
campaign contributions would fall within the coverage of the
Hobbs Act.
52 McCormick, 111 S. Ct. at 1816.
53 Id.
54 Perhaps corruption has been selectively prosecuted and exposed.
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2. Congress couldn't have intended to cover routine campaign
contributions with the Hobbs Act.
3. Therefore, if we follow Congress's probable wishes, we must
have an explicit quid pro quo requirement.
The most obvious problem is with the first premise: Justice White
sets up a false dichotomy. Although an explicit quid pro quo
requirement will make it harder to convict, it neither solves nor
supplants the inquiry necessary under the pre-existing law. Indeed,
Justice White seems not to have tried to ascertain the pre-existing
law. Is this new test really better than the rule that had served so
well for centuries-that the payment be "corrupt" or "wrongful"?
Let's look at two situations, both involving corrupt takings
without an explicit quid pro quo:
(1) An elected judge approaches a lawyer in a major case pending
before the judge and says, "I haven't heard from you yet. Would
you donate $100,000 to my re-election fund?" Result: not official
extortion under Justice White's test.
(2) An elected legislator approaches a businessman and says, "If
you pay me $100,000 for my campaign, I can't promise you how
I'll vote on the many pieces of legislation affecting your company-
that would be illegal. But if you contribute, I predict that I will
vote your way." Result: not official extortion under Justice
White's test.
Although both of these situations would have been Hobbs Act
extortion under color of official right before McCormick, were one
to judge only from Justice White's odd opinion in McCormick, they
wouldn't be now. Quid pro quos may or may not be implied in
these situations, but they certainly aren't explicit. Neither explicitly
promises any specific action.
55
2. Justice Scalia's Concurrence in McCormick:
Extortion: A False-Pretenses Offense?
Justice Scalia's concurrence in McCormick is unusual because of
its silence on the issues actually decided in that case. Instead,
Justice Scalia asks whether courts have been wrong all these years in
interpreting extortion "under color of official right" as meaning
55 Other federal crimes besides official extortion, including perhaps extortion by
fear, may or may not have been committed.
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extortion paid on account of one's office.5 6  He suggests that
perhaps it means paid under a false claim of official right.57 He
doesn't purport to decide the issue, only to raise it. And he cites
authorities on both sides.58  Yet it was clear which way he was
leaning before having a chance to study the issue-toward making
official extortion a false-pretenses offense. This novel suggestion
forms the basis of Justice Thomas's opinion in Evans, which Justice
Scalia joined. 59
Justice Scalia's attempt to turn extortion into a false-pretenses
offense is a strange one, coming as it does so soon on the heels of
academic attempts to restrict official extortion to a coercion
offense.60  Indeed, the defendants' brief in Evans argues that
official extortion should be limited to coercion, 61 though that
restriction had consistently failed in the courts of appeals.
B. Evans v. United States
In 1992 in Evans v. United States,62 the Supreme Court settled
most of the open questions left by McCormick. Writing for the
majority in Evans, Justice Stevens (who had dissented in McCormick)
found no inducement requirement and a wide overlap between
bribery and extortion.63 Justice Thomas filed a long, angry dissent
(joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia) arguing for a
robust inducement requirement and for a pretense of entitlement
as the method of taking.64 Justice O'Connor wrote a brief concur-
rence, joining Justice Stevens in his rejection of an inducement
56 McCormick, 111 S. Ct. at 1819.
57 See id.
58 See id. at 1819-20.
59 Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1894 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
60 See Andrew T. Baxter, Federal Discretion in the Prosecution of Local Political
Corruption, 10 PEPP. L. REV. 321 (1983); Thomas H. Henderson, Jr., The Expanding
Role of Federal Prosecutors in Combating State and Local Political Corruption, 8 CUMB. L.
REV. 385 (1977); Ruff, supra note 19, at 1171; Dibble, supra note 12, at 387; Fleissner,
supra note 12, at 1066; Joseph M. Harary, Note, Misapplication of the Hobbs Act to
Bribety, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1340 (1985); Laurel G. Sandler, Note, Extortion "Under
Color of Official Right'." Federal Prosecution of Official Corruption Under the Hobbs Act, 5
LoY. U. CI. L.J. 513 (1974); Herbert M. Suskin, Note, Federal Prosecution of Local
Political Corruption: A New Approach, 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 390 (1975); Note, United
States v. Mazzei: Hobbs Act Extortion Under Color of Official Right, 62 VA. L. REV. 439
(1976).
61 See Evans, 112 S. Ct. at 1889 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 22).
62 See 112 S. Ct. 1881 (1992).
63 See id. at 1888.
64 See id. at 1894-1904 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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requirement, but declining to consider the novel Thomas-Scalia
false-pretenses argument which, she noted, hadn't been raised by
the parties.65 Justice Kennedy wrote a concurrence rejecting the
false-pretenses argument, but finding an inducement requirement
that can be easily met by a quid pro quo.
66
The New York Times implied that acrimony on the Court delayed
the Evans decision.67 Later, while criticizing Justice Thomas's first
year on the Supreme Court, the Times cited his dissent in Evans as
evidence that "Justice Thomas has failed the test of judicious-
ness."68 To my mind, the acrimony sharpened the arguments of
all sides so that it's now possible to see both what's good and what's
bad about them.
John H. Evans was an elected Commissioner of DeKalb County,
Georgia, who was caught accepting payoffs in a government sting
operation. A special agent with the FBI, Cormany, posed as a real
estate developer seeking a "leg up" on other developers in DeKalb
County in obtaining rezoning approval for high-density housing.
69
Through an intermediary, Cormany arranged a first meeting with
Evans, leading to a series of meetings and telephone conversations
between Evans and Cormany, culminating in Evans discussing his
campaign financing with Cormany.7' Although demonstrating to
Cormany that he needed $7885, Evans assured Cormany that
regardless of how many thousands of dollars the agent donated,
Evans would do what he promised he would: "If you gave me six,
I'll do exactly what I said I was gonna do for you. If you gave me
one, I'll do exactly what I said I was gonna do for you."71 Evans
65 See id. at 1891 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
6 See id. at 1891-94 (Kennedy, J., concurring).67 See Linda Greenhouse, Court Upholds Widened Use of U.S. Extortion Law, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 1992, at A17 ("[T]he case apparently provoked an intense debate
within the Court in the nearly six months since it was argued.").
68 See Justice Thomas, the Freshman, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1992, § 4, at 10.
New justices are as free as any others to be cranky, stubborn, loud or
vigorous. That's not what's troublesome looking back overJustice Thomas's
record. The problem is that his arguments read more like boilerplate
attacks on political opponents than lawyerly debates with colleagues on the
same bench.
In a quarrel over the scope of the Federal extortion law, he accused his
colleagues not merely of rejecting better interpretations but of making up
their own version of the law.
Id.
69 United States v. Evans, 910 F.2d 790, 792 (11th Cir. 1990).
70 Id. at 792-94.
71 Id. at 794.
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also requested that $1000 of the donation be by check and the rest
in cash. 72 Evans reported the $1000 check as a campaign contribu-
tion, but "locked the $7000 in cash in a drawer in a file cabinet in
his campaign office" and failed to report it in either his campaign
reports or his tax return. 73 He was convicted of extortion under
color of official right and income tax evasion, and his conviction was
affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 74 and by the
United States Supreme Court.
75
1. Inducement
The issue on which certiorari was granted was whether the
official has to have induced the payment, and if so, what constitutes
inducement.76 The inducement question is a complex one because
the inducement requirement intersects with other issues, such as the
parsing of the language of the Hobbs Act and possible requirements
that the official make a demand, use coercion beyond that implicit
in his office, or initiate negotiations.
The place to start is with the Hobbs Act. It provides: "(2) The
term 'extortion' means the obtaining of property from another, with
his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force,
violence, or fear, or under color of official right."77 The first
question is whether the word "induced" applies only to coercive
extortion or whether it applies to both coercive and official
extortion. Justice Stevens argued:
First, we think the word "induced" is a part of the definition
of the offense by the private individual, but not the offense by the
public official. In the case of the private individual, the victim's
consent must be "induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened
force, violence or fear." In the case of the public official, however,
there is no such requirement. The statute merely requires of the
public official that he obtain "property from another, with his
consent, ... under color of official right." The use of the word
"or" before "under color of official right" supports this reading.
Second, even if the statute were parsed so that the word
"induced" applied to the public officeholder, we do not believe the
72 See id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 792.
75 Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881 (1992).76 id. at 1883.
77 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988) (emphasis added).
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word "induced" necessarily indicates that the transaction must be
initiated by the recipient of the bribe. Many of the cases applying
the majority rule have concluded that the wrongful acceptance of
a bribe establishes all the inducement that the statute requires.
They conclude that the coercive element is provided by the public
office itself. And even the two courts that have adopted an
inducement requirement for extortion under color of official right
do not require proof that the inducement took the form of a
threat or demand.78
Thus, under the Court's majority opinion in Evans, official extortion
has no inducement requirement.
Justices Kennedy and Thomas disagree with Justice Stevens's
first argument, arguing instead that "induced" applies to both
coercive and official extortion. 79 As much as I disagree with the
rest of Justice Thomas's opinion, on this limited point I believe he's
correct. Reading "induced" as applying to official extortion is the
most natural way to read the statute.
Further, this statutory language was borrowed from the Field
Code of 1865, which was enacted as the New York Penal Code in
1881.80 In the original Field Code, the official commentary stated:
"In extortion there is again a taking. Now it is with the consent of
the party injured; but this is a consent induced by threats, or under
color of some official right."8' Although it's possible to again read
"induced" as not applying to "under color of... official right," I
find such a disjunctive reading more difficult for the Field Code
commentary. One can read the Hobbs Act as saying "obtaining...
under color of official right," but in the comments to the Field
Code, the word "obtaining" doesn't appear, and thus can't be used
as a crutch to support a disjunctive reading.
The real question should be how much independent content
should be given to the word "induced," other than as introducing
the situation that induces the payment, "under color of official
right." On this I am in basic agreement with the Evans majority.
Justice Thomas, on the other hand, seems to jump from his parsing
of the statutory language to an argument that the official must have
very actively defrauded the payor into making an unwarranted
payment.
78 Evans, 112 S. Ct. at 1888 (footnotes omitted).
79 See id. at 1892 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1897 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
80 See supra note 1.
81 FIELD CODE, supra note 1, at § 584, commentary at 210 (1865).
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Justice Stevens's fallback position 2 (which is close to Justice
Kennedy's view)83 makes more sense to me. As most Courts of
Appeals that addressed the issue have held, the wrongful acceptance
of a bribe is enough to meet any inducement requirement.84 This
is what I call the situational inducement approach. As long as the
official receives the wrongful payoff knowing that it's paid on
account of his office (or under Evans, in return for official services),
official extortion has been committed. This approach is most
consistent with the language and common law origins of the Hobbs
Act.
The idea that the official himself must do the inducing has been
advanced by some courts and several commentators, but the
statutory language says nothing of the kind. It states the situation
under which extortion must be induced, under color of official
right. It says nothing about an inducer. Unlike some blackmail and
private citizen extortion statutes that punish the threatener,85 the
Hobbs Act quite pointedly punishes the person who obtains the
property, not the person or situation that induces the transfer. The
statute wisely avoids getting into discussions about when the acts of
others are chargeable to the official. As long as the situational
requirement is met, any inducement requirement should automati-
cally be satisfied. This is consistent with the historical approach to
extortion, an approach unconcerned with the precise method of
wrongful taking-bribery, coercion, or false pretenses. Thus, while
I agree with Justice Thomas that the word "induced" probably
applies to official extortion, I agree with Justice Stevens and the
majority that the word "induced" adds nothing to the other
elements required for extortion. This isn't reading the word
82 See Evans, 112 S. Ct. at 1889.
83 See id. at 1892 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
84 See United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304, 311 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Extortion
'under color of official right' equals the knowing receipt of bribes . . . ."); United
States v. Butler, 618 F.2d 411,418 (6th Cir.) ("[A] showing that the motivation for the
payment focuses on the recipient's office, regardless of who induces the payments,
is sufficient to convict under the Hobbs Act."), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 927 (1980);
United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139, 151 (7th Cir. 1974) ("So long as the
motivation for the payment focuses on the recipient's office, the conduct falls within
the ambit of [the Hobbs Act]."), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); see also Dibble,
supra note 12, at 395; Fleissner, supra note 12, at 1073-74.
85 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 836.05 (1991) ("Whoever... maliciously threatens to
accuse another of any crime ... with intent to extort money.., shall be guilty of a
felony ....").
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"induced" out of the statute; rather, it's reading it together with the
words "under color of official right."
I'm comfortable with the Court's holding that there is no
inducement requirement because that's certainly a simpler and
easier rule to apply than a rule that inducement is met by the
situation of the receipt of the payoff-under color of official right.
2. Color of Official Right
Just about everyone (including both Justices Stevens and
Thomas) agrees that the Hobbs Act language "color of official right"
is equivalent to the old common law terms "color of office" or
"colore offlcii."8 6 In Evans, Justice Stevens adopts my theory of the
history of extortion87 -that extortion under color of office em-
braced takings by coercion, false pretenses, and bribery.88 Thus
bribe-taking is extortion when it meets the other requirements of
the statute.
At the time I wrote my history, there were a large number of
student notes, and even a few commentaries by academics, arguing
chiefly that extortion at English common law required coercion.
89
They were so inadequately researched that between them they
didn't cite even one early English extortion case in support of their
position.90 In contrast, I have found scores of English and Ameri-
can cases and statutes where the method of taking was bribery or
false pretenses, 91 thus exploding the myth that extortion was
limited to coercion.
Most of these authors also argued that under New York law,
which was a model for the Hobbs Act, official extortion and bribery
were mutually exclusive. I discovered that the cases they cited in
support weren't even official extortion cases, but rather were
coercive extortion cases.92 Further, I found only one New York
86 See Evans, 112 S. Ct. at 1885 & nn. 4-5; id. at 1895 & n.1 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); see also Lindgren, supra note 4, at 819-20 & n.24.
87 See Evans, 112 S. Ct. at 1885.
88 See generally Lindgren, supra note 4.
89 See sources cited supra note 60.
90 Noonan, however, cites one English statutory extortion case-the impeachment
proceedings of Warren Hastings. See NOONAN, supra note 6, at 398. Unfortunately,
those proceedings charged Hastings with extortion for receiving a bribe, so Noonan
doesn't offer the case as support for his position, but rather as an incorrect example.
See id.
91 See Lindgren, supra note 4, at 851-72, 885-86, 896-902.
92 See id. at 902-03.
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case directly on point, People v. Hansen.93 In that case, convictions
for bribery and extortion under color of official right were sustained
on the same facts, even though the defendant unsuccessfully argued
on appeal that these crimes were mutually exclusive. 94 Moreover,
I pointed out that by New York statute, the method of taking for
official extortion was the same as for bribery-asking, receiving, or
agreeing to receive a payment.
95
I also explored the origins of the Hobbs Act language in
Hawkins's and Coke's early definitions of common law extortion,
and in the nineteenth century Field Code.96 In the late nineteenth
century, after the "color of official right" language was drafted,
some American courts became confused over the original scope of
common law extortion. Thus, in the early twentieth century, the
cases were a mess.97 Some courts still got it more or less right;
some even upheld convictions for extortion and bribery on the same
facts. 98  But other courts suggested that extortion was coercive
while bribery was voluntary or offered other odd ways to drive the
two crimes apart,99 such as issuing dicta used by Justices Scalia and
Thomas to support their false-pretenses view. Without trying to sort
out which was the larger group of cases, I pointed out (1) that the
courts taking novel approaches were not aware that they had
93 150 N.E. 542 (N.Y. 1925), aff'g 207 N.Y.S. 894 (1924) (affirming a judgment
"rendered upon a verdict convicting the defendant of the crimes of extortion, bribery
and taking unlawful fees"). For a discussion of the facts of this case, see Lindgren,
supra note 4, at 901.
94 Hansen, 150 N.E. at 542.
95 See Lindgren, supra note 4, at 897-900 (comparing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 557
(1881), under which the method of taking for extortion is "asks, or receives, oragrees
to receive" with N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 45, 67, & 72 (1881), under which the method of
taking for bribery is also defined as "asks, receives, or agrees to receive").
96 See Lindgren, supra note 4, at 862-65, 892-96.97 See id. at 886-87 (noting that "cases began to misstate the traditional scope of
common law extortion").
98 See Martin v. United States, 278 F. 913 (2d Cir. 1922) (involving visa officer
convicted of both bribery and official extortion for taking $30 "grease" payment to
speed up processing); State v. Vallee, 12 A.2d 421 (Me. 1940) (holding shakedown of
public janitor by county commissioner to be both extortion by fear and bribery);
People v. Hansen, 150 N.E. 542 (N.Y. 1925) (per curiam), affg 207 N.Y.S. 894 (1924)
(upholding convictions for both bribery and extortion under color of official right on
the same facts, despite defendant's argument that the two crimes were mutually
exclusive); Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 Pa. Super. 470 (1903) (holding that the
object offenses of a conspiracy to take payoffs to appoint teachers are both extortion
and bribery).
9 See Daniels v. United States, 17 F.2d 339, 342 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 274 U.S.
744 (1927); United States v. Harned, 43 F. 376, 377 (D. Wash. 1890); State v.
Pritchard, 12 S.E. 50, 52 (N.C. 1890).
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misunderstood common law extortion, and (2) that the coercion
side channel was eventually rejected by the United States Courts of
Appeal after 1972.1°°
Interestingly, the attack has shifted since my article was
published. The previous two main supports for the position
opposing mine-English common law and New York law-have been
largely jettisoned. Now the attack is centered on the only set of
authorities that I didn't analyze in depth-American cases of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century outside of New York. 10 1
While I think that these cases are relevant, I don't agree that
they are the most relevant group of authorities. First, as Justice
Stevens argues, we should interpret "terms of art" according to "the
legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice." 10 2 Justice
Stevens also argues, quoting Justice Frankfurter, that "if a word is
obviously transplanted from another legal source, whether the
common law or other legislation, it brings the old soil with it."
103
The Hobbs Act's roots run through the Field Code to Wharton, and
ultimately to Hawkins. 1°4 Thus, its language is common law lan-
guage and should be so interpreted. Most of the twentieth century
cases, in contrast, are cases of statutory extortion.
Second, I find it hard to rely too heavily on the case law when
it's so confused and disparate. If it were clear and pointed in one
direction, I would afford it great weight. But it's a swamp. Anyone
who suggests that the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
cases are dear is either less than candid or hasn't done enough research.1°
100See Lindgren, supra note 4, at 817.18 & nn.15-17.
101 See infra note 105.
102 Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1885 (1992) (quoting Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952)).103 Id. at 1885 n.3 (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 COLuM. L. REv. 527, 537 (1947)).
104 See Lindgren, supra note 4, at 887, 892-96.
105 While this article was in draft, an article was published that attacked my
position. See Dan K. Webb et al., Limiting Public Cormption Prosecutions Under the
Hobbs Act: Will United States v. Evans be the Next McNally?, 67 CHIKENT L. REV. 29
(1991). Contrary both to my contention that extortion included bribery and to justice
Thomas's contention that extortion was limited to a pretense of entitlement, the
Webb article contends that extortion was limited to "coercion, duress or inducement."
Id. at 47. Of course, these are far from equivalent claims. If only inducement is
required, the agreement to receive it might constitute the inducement. I have always
thought that the Hobbs Act required inducement because of the statute's particular
language, but that knowing receipt is all that's needed for inducement. Seesupra part
III.B.1. Most federal courts before Evans also agreed that coercion wasn't required
and that any inducement was easily met by knowing receipt.
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Third, I grant much less weight to opinions that attempt to
follow the traditional meaning of extortion, but unwittingly make
To the extent that the Webb article argues that coercion is required, it picks up
the main line of academic attack on the Hobbs Act that had prevailed before I
published my 1988 history. I frankly thought that this large, mostly reciprocal-citing
academic literature had been laid to rest, but I see that it's not quite dead yet. The
authors are lawyers at Winston & Strawn, at least two of whom have defended
accused or convicted corrupt officials. Indeed, their article reads as if it were a
recycled brief, though because it lacks the usual disclaimer of past paid representation
to take the positions expressed, it may not be.
In my 1988 article, see supra note 4, I showed that the two main pillars of the
coercion thesis-the English common law and New York law-didn't support their
edifice, but instead strongly supported my contrary conclusion, that extortion wasn't
limited to coercion. See id. Interestingly, in the Webb article, the English common
law is rejected as irrelevant, and their discussion of New York law consciously ignores
the only case on point, People v. Hansen, 150 N.E. 542 (N.Y. 1925). Besides their
misreliance on New York law, the defense lawyer-authors otherwise rely on the only
set of authorities that I didn't systematically examine (or claim to examine)-the case
law in jurisdictions other than New York before the Hobbs Act was passed in 1946.
In 1988, I argued that in the late nineteenth century, the law of extortion split
into two channels, one getting it more or less correctly and one getting it wrong. See
Lindgren, supra note 4, at 886. Contrary to the implications of the defense lawyers,
I made no claims about which channel was larger. Rather, I claimed that the
"extortion as coercion" view was a side channel in the sense that it was inconsistent
with both the earlier history and the later understanding in the modern federal
courts. The defense lawyers argue, on the other hand, that there was essentially only
one view at the time-theirs.
This puts our descriptions squarely at odds. They claim that there was only one
channel; I claim that there were two. They claim that the law was dear; I claim that
it was a mess. That's why I carefully traced the origins of the Hobbs Act language in
the New York Field Code and the English common law treatises before the law split
into two channels. Because I always claimed that there were some cases expressing
their view of the law and they claim that their view was essentially the only view, I can
easily establish that my view of multiple approaches is the correct characterization.
All I have to do is show some cases where bribery behavior was punished as extortion.
I can do better than that. In four cases-Martin, Vallee, Hansen, and Brown-
defendants were convicted of both extortion and bribery on the same facts. Seesupra
notes 10, 93-94 & 98 and accompanying text. For the more common cases where
bribery behavior was punished as extortion, see Lindgren, supra note 4, at 852-62,
904-05; David Burgess, The Meaning of "Under Color of Office" 28-30 (Mar. 26, 1993)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
The full history of the case law of the various jurisdictions before the Hobbs Act
was passed is yet to be written. The Webb article is helpful because it collects most
of the cases on one side of the debate, but its characterizations are totally unpersua-
sive, particularly on New York law and federal law, because they ignore the contrary
evidence. This style of brief-writing is always risky before a scholarly court of appeals,
but it's deadly in the law reviews where someone may have the time to look at the
larger history. And it's too easy to refute. Any substantial contrary evidence proves
them wrong. Moreover, an analysis of these confusing cases may be imminent: David
Burgess, a student of mine, is undertaking a review of the meaning of "color of
office" preceding the Hobbs Act's enactment in 1946.
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new law, than I grant to opinions by judges who know what they're
doing and follow the traditional meaning of extortion. I thus give
more weight to cases that are in the tradition of centuries-that is,
cases that are consistent with both earlier and later cases.
3. Justice Thomas's Theory That Color of Office
Means False Pretenses
After citing Hawkins's and Blackstone's definitions of extortion-
which make no mention of the method of taking besides that it be
by color of office or official right-Justice Thomas argues:
These definitions pose, but do not answer, the critical
question: what does it mean for an official to take money "by
colour of his office"? The Court fails to address this question,
simply assuming that common-law extortion encompassed any
taking by a public official of something of value that he was not
"due."
The "under color of office" element of extortion, however,
had a definite and well-established meaning at common law. At
common law it was essential that the money or property be
obtained under color of office, that is, under the pretense that the
officer was entitled thereto by virtue of his office.'I"
Justice Thomas's attack on my article is both direct and indirect.
First, he criticizes Justice Stevens's heavy reliance on my work:
The Court's historical analysis rests upon a theory set forth in
one law review article. See ante, at 1884-85, and nn. 4-6 (citing
Lindgren, The Elusive Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion:
From the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 815
(1988)). Focusing on early English cases, the article argues that
common-law extortion encompassed a wide range of official
takings, whether by coercion, false pretenses, or bribery. Whatev-
er the merits of that argument as a description of early English
common law, it is beside the point here-the critical inquiry for
our purposes is the American understanding of the crime at the
time the Hobbs Act was passed in 1946.107
In a footnote, he goes on to express skepticism about my account
of common law extortion:
Those merits are far from clear. Most commentators maintain
that extortion and bribery were distinct crimes at early English
106 Evans, 112 S. Ct. at 1895 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
1
0 7 Id. at 1895-96 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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common law. See, e.g., J. Noonan, Bribes 398, 585-587 (1984);
Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in
the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 Geo. LJ. 1171, 1179-
1180 (1977). While-as I explain below-Professor Lindgren
may well be correct that common-law extortion did not contain an
"inducement" element, in my view he does not adequately account
for the crime's "by color of office" element. This latter element
has existed since long before the Founding of the Republic, and
cannot simply be ignored. As Chief Justice Montague explained
over four centuries ago, colore offlcii sui ("by color of his office")
"signifies an Act badly done under the Countenance of an Office, and
it bears a dissembling Visage of Duty, and is properly called Extor-
tion." Dive v. Maningham, 1 Plowd. 60, 68, 75 Eng. Rep. 96 (C.B.
1550) (emphasis added). See also 3 E. Coke, Institutes *542
(describing extortion as "more odious than robbery; for robbery
is apparent, and hath the face of a crime, but extortion puts on the
visure of virtue") (emphasis added).
1 8
Justice Thomas contends that color of office is what distinguish-
es official extortion from bribery. According to Justice Thomas,
color of office means a pretense that the money was owing. He
argues:
Regardless of whether extortion contains an "inducement" require-
ment, bribery and extortion are different crimes. An official who
solicits or takes a bribe does not do so "under color of office"; i.e.,
under any pretense of official entitlement.10 9
This would turn extortion into a false-pretenses offense.
Yet there are big problems with Justice Thomas's argument.
The first problem is noted by Justice Stevens and echoed by Justice
Kennedy. Justice Stevens argues:
The dissent's theory notwithstanding, not one of the cases it
cites holds that the public official is innocent unless he has
deceived the payor by representing that the payment was proper.
Indeed, none makes any reference to the state of mind of the
payor, and none states that a "false pretense" is an element of the
offense. Instead, those cases merely support the proposition that
the services for which the fee is paid must be official and that the
official must not be entitled to the fee that he collected-both
elements of the offense that are clearly satisfied in this case. The
complete absence of support for the dissent's thesis presumably
explains why it was not advanced by petitioner in the District
108 Id. at 1896 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 1897 (Thomas, J, dissenting).
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Court or the Court of Appeals, is not recognized by any Court of
Appeals, and is not advanced in any scholarly commentary.
110
If you read the cases that Justice Thomas cites for his view, his
argument looks even weaker: none offer direct support for his
position. A few have dicta pointing in his direction1 1 or are
based on special statutes that explicitly required something beyond
the common law crime.112 But most of Justice Thomas's cases
offer no support of any kind, merely showing that false pretenses is
a proper class of extortion case, not that false pretenses are
necessary. Indeed, two of the cases he cites, Dean v. State113 and
Hanly v. State,114 held more or less the opposite. In Dean, the
defendant challenged the indictment, claiming that it was "defective,
because it is not alleged whether the defendant was executing, or
pretending to execute, some legal.., paper under color of his of-
fice." 115 The court rejected the defendant's claim, affirming the
conviction, and stating that extortion didn't require a pretense of
legal process. 116 In addition, the court noted that the defendant
"may be guilty if he extorts such money upon promise not to
execute." 117 If a person commits extortion by taking money for
promising not to execute legal process (when obviously no fee is
owing), how can it be said that the money is taken under a pretense
of entitlement, accepted in right of office, or obtained from victims
110 Evans, 112 S. Ct. at 1890 (citation omitted). Justice Kennedy argues:
While the dissent may well be correct that prior to the enactment of the
Hobbs Act a large number of the reported official extortion cases in the
United States happened to involve false pretenses, those cases do not so
much as hint that a false pretense of right was ever considered as an
essential element of the offense. Furthermore, as the Court demonstrates,
during the same period other American courts affirmed convictions of
public officials for extortion based upon corrupt receipt of payment absent
any claim of right.
Id. at 1893-94 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted). I think that Justice
Kennedy goes a bit too far. There are certainly hints in some of the cases that false
pretenses might be an element of the offense.
I See, e.g., Collier v. State, 55 Ala. 125, 127-28 (1876).
112 See e.g., Commonwealth v. Bagley, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 279,279 (1828) (involving
an unusual Massachusetts extortion statute that required that a defendant "demand
and receive," rather than the more typical "demand or receive").
11 71 S.E. 597 (Ga. Ct. App. 1911).
114 104 N.W. 57 (Wis. 1905).
115 Dean, 71 S.E. at 598.
116 See id. at 598.
117 Id. at 598-99.
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yielding to official authority? Payoffs to officials for not doing their
jobs are bribes and, as Dean holds, such payoffs are extortion.
Another of Justice Thomas's cited cases, Hanley v. State,
1 18
rejects the defendants' claim that extortion is limited to a demand
for a fee to which the defendants were not entitled. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court distinguished a narrower case of statutory extor-
tion1 19 from the broader common law extortion offense that had
been codified in Hanley. Once again, Justice Thomas's approach to
common law extortion was explicitly rejected in a case he cites for
support.
What is perhaps more devastating to Justice Thomas's view is
that both extortion and bribery were and are color of office
offenses. Thus, color of office can't distinguish bribery from
extortion and it doesn't mean anything that wouldn't apply equally
to bribery and extortion. Color of office can't require false
pretenses, because then both extortion and bribery would have to
be false-pretense offenses. To illustrate this problem with Justice
Thomas's argument, I will start with one of the authorities he cites
above-Coke's Institutes.
Note Coke's definition of bribery:
Bribery is a great misprision when any man in Judicial place takes
any Fee or Pension, Robe, or Livery, Gift, Reward or Brocage of
any person, that hath to do before him any way, for doing his office,
or by colour of his office, but of the King only, unless it be of meat
and drink, and that of small value, upon divers, and grievous
punishments.
120
According to Coke, bribery was a color of office offense, as was
extortion.
12 1
118 104 N.W. 57 (Wis. 1905).
119 See State v. Oden, 37 N.E. 731,732 (Ind. 1894) (pointing out that common law
extortion was broader than the extortion fee statute involved in the case).
120 EDwARD COKE, THIRD INSTITUTE 587 (J. Thomas ed., 1826) (emphasis added).
121 See id. ("But largely extortion is taken for any oppression by extort power, or
by colour or pretence of right. .. ."); see also id. at 584 ("Extortion, in its proper
sense, is a great misprision, by wresting or unlawfully taking by any officer, by colour
of his office, any money or valuable thing... either that is not due, or more than is
due, or before it be due. .... ).
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Hawkins, who was the ultimate source for the official right
language in the Hobbs Act,122 also defined bribery as a color of
office offense:
Bribery in a strict sense is taken for a great misprision of one in
ajudicial place, taking any valuable thing whatsoever, except meat
and drink of small value, of any one who has to do before him any
wayfor ... doing his office, or by colour of his office, but of the king
only.'
23
An interesting aspect of Coke's and Hawkins's definitions is that,
because takings "for doing his office" are what one traditionally
thinks of as extortion-type behavior, takings "by colour of office"
must represent takings not to perform properly, which is the core
of bribery. Thus, not only does color of office cover bribery, but it's
used in bribery definitions to describe the central kind of bribery:
takings to pervert official decisionmaking. Those who would read
color of office as referring only to a pretense that the money was
owed would be cutting out not just a large part of the law of
extortion, but the very core of the crime of bribery itself. In short,
an official fulfilling his duties properly without taking corrupt
payments is acting by virtue of his office. An official acting
improperly in his official duties acts under the color of his office.
His office provides cover for his corruption; 124 it gives his mis-
deeds the "color of official right." Like most white-collar criminals,
an official taking bribes or extortion payments has a semblance or
appearance of proper or right behavior, but acts corruptly. Coke
explains that colour officii refers to acts in the bad part of an office,
while virtute officii refers to acts in the good part of an office.
125
122 Hawkins defined extortion:
[I]t is said, That extortion in a large sense signifies any oppression under
colour of right; but that in a strict sense, it signifies the taking of money by
any officer, by colour of his office, either where none at all is due, or not
so much is due, or where it is not yet due.
WIInAM HAwKINs, 1 A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 316 (Thomas Leach
ed., 6th ed. 1788).
'2 1 id. at 311-12 (emphasis added).
124 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Norris, 87 Pa. Super. 61, 64 (1925) (involving an
officer who used official authority to receive a payoff in exchange for allowing a
prisoner to go free).
125 1 EDWARD COKE, SECOND INSTITUTEs 206 (1799 ed.) ("Colour offlcii is ever
taken in malem partem, as vilrtute officii is taken in bonam: and therefore this implyeth
a seisure unduly made against law.").
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Color of office has remained part of the definition of bribery
offenses to the present day. Consider these statements from
twentieth-century bribery cases:
(1) "[T]he essence of the crime [of bribery] is the fact that he
agreed to do it under color of office."
126
(2) It is not essential that the official action induced by the bribe
be lawful; it is sufficient that it is official in form and done under
color of office, so that the offer, or receipt by an authorized officer,
of a bribe to release one from arrest is criminal without regard to
the legality of the arrest.
The official act influenced by the bribe need not be lawful to
render one liable for bribery, but need only be official in form,
and done under color of office. In other words, as long as the
officer's act has actual relation to his official employment, it is
immaterial that the law imposes no duty on him to act or that he
has no direct authority to act. Thus it is not necessary, in order
to constitute bribery, that the public official be influenced in
regard to a measure which can be legally enforced.
12 7
(3) He asked and agreed to take $500 in money, and promised that
in consideration thereof he would discharge the accused after
hearing the charge against him. While "in judicial place" he
agreed to take a bribe for doing an act official in character, and
which was in the nature of an "official proceeding." For a certain
amount of money he was to make a certain decision as coroner,
and it was because he had power to make that decision that he was
able to exact a bribe. All his acts were official in form, and all that
he did was by color of his office.... It is sufficient if the defendant
assumed, colore officii, to perform a function belonging to his
office, even if the right to perform it did not exist in the particular
case.
128
(4) The thrust of the malfeasance charges.., stems from the offer
to accept the bribe, and not any actual acceptance of bribe money.
"Public officers.., are indictable for corruption if they accept or
offer to accept, under color of office, any money or other benefit
calculated in any way to influence their official course..."129
126 State v. Hendricks, 186 P.2d 943, 947 (Ariz. 1947) (emphasis added) (quoting
1 BURDICK, LAW OF CRIME § 291).
127 Vinyard v. United States, 335 F.2d 176, 182-83 (8th Cir.) (emphasis added)
(quoting 11 C.J.S. Bribery § 2e(3) (1938)), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 930 (1964).
128 People v. Jackson, 84 N.E. 65, 67 (N.Y. 1908) (emphasis added).
129 Wallace v. State, 211 A.2d 845, 850 (Del. 1965) (second emphasis added)
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(5) [T]he defendant used the real or supposed power of this office
to obtain money for himself by a corrupt trade in violation of his
public duty, and that under color of his office he exercised de facto
the power needed to accomplish what he set out to do. In a
situation of this kind there is present every element which renders
the acceptance of a bribe abhorrent to all right thinking peo-
ple.... We do not mean to say that an officer can be convicted of
bribery in respect to acts entirely unrelated to his office. But
where as here he acts under color of his offrce we think that a
sufficient relation exists."130
(6) A bribery charge is "dependent on the evidence as to the
extent, if at all, [the defendants] acted, or assumed to act,
officially, or colore officii." 1s
(7) It is unnecessary to determine "whether an offense committed
under color of office was bribery or extortion."
13 2
One can get a good idea of what "color of office" means from its
use in these cases. It usually refers to the occasion for the payment
and what the officer intends to do if paid. AsJustice Montague says
in the passage quoted by Justice Thomas, colore officii "signifies an
act badly done under the countenance of an office."13 3 The case
from which this statement is taken, Dive v. Maningham,13 4 nicely
shows the overlap of bribery and extortion. There, for a bribe, a
sheriff released a prisoner in custody on a debt. The prisoner's
brother gave the sheriff a bond promising a payoff to the sheriff
and agreeing to indemnify the sheriff if the King or the creditor
were to sue the sheriff for letting the prisoner escape. The sheriff
then sued on the bond to collect his bribe, but such bonds were by
statute void in part because they were taken by "colore officii."
13 5
The court called such schemes "bribery" and "extortion," and gave
judgment for the prisoner's brother. Montague further illustrated
the meaning of color of office when he explained how a sheriff can
(quoting 2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 1900 at 2236-37 (1932)) (describing a
conviction for malfeasance for agreeing to accept a bribe).
150 Commonwealth v. Avery, 18 N.E.2d 353, 354 (Mass. 1938) (emphasis added).
131 State v. Carney, 14 Ohio Op. 298,302 (Com. Pleas Ct. 1939) (emphasis added).
132 United States v. Butler, 618 F.2d 411, 419 (6th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 927 (1980).
133 Dive v. Maningham, 75 Eng. Rep. 96, 108 (C.B. 1550) (quoted in Evans v.
United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1896 n.2 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
134 Id.
135 Id. at 107-08.
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act illegally while acting officially: "he took it unduly.... but yet he
took it as sheriff, ergo he took it colore offCii sui."
11 6
Another passage quoted by Justice Thomas defines "color of
office" in part as
"the use of official authority as a pretext or cover for the commis-
sion of some corrupt or vicious act; an act evilly done, by the
countenance of an office; an act unjustly done by the countenance
of an office; an act wrongfully done by an officer under the
pretended authority of his office."
13 7
The case that Justice Thomas cites as "typical case,"1 38 Collier
v. State,13 9 is an illustration of the real meaning of color of office.
In Collier, a prosecutor took a fee, not for his official services as a
prosecutor, but for extra services as a lawyer rendering legal advice.
Although there is dictum in the opinion supporting Justice
Thomas's false-pretenses view, the case concerns a statute narrower
than common law extortion. Moreover, the actual holding is that
if an official takes a fee for real services outside his official ones, he
doesn't take the property under color of office. 140 Here the case
was drawing the usual extortion distinction between apparently
official acts and extra services. In both the law of bribery and the
law of extortion, color of office performs the same function. It
limits these crimes to payoffs for official acts or acts that appear to
be official acts.
Judge Noonan (who views extortion as necessarily coercive)
incorrectly states in his superseded Aguon opinion, "If money was
paid voluntarily, it was not obtained by the officer 'by color of his
office.'" 141 If that were true, then bribery could not be voluntary
because bribery and extortion are both offenses committed "by
color of office." Rather than distinguish extortion from bribery, the
traditional "color of office" language links the two offenses.
" Id. at 108; see also Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of "Under Color of" Law, 91
MICH. L. REV. 325, 345 (1992) (accurately discussing Dive at length, but making no
mention of the McCormick or Evans cases debating the meaning of the phrase "under
color of"; article appeared while this Article was in press).
137 Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 1895 n.1 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(quoting 7 Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure 401-02 (1903)).138 Id. at 1896 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
139 55 Ala. 125 (1876).
140 See id. at 127.
141 United States v. Aguon, 813 F.2d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded, 851
F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
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4. Noonan and Ruff
Justice Thomas also cites Judge John Noonan's Bribes142 and
Charles Ruff's Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption1 43 as contrary
authority to my history of extortion at English common law. But
neither Noonan nor Ruff wrote a history of extortion and neither
cites any extortion cases to support their views that extortion was
limited to coercion at English common law. Ruff appears mostly to
have depended on two common law treatises and, although the
treatises don't claim that extortion was coercive, he squeezes their
claims into that mold. In all, Ruff has only seven sentences of text
on the history of common-law extortion. None of the authorities he
cites say that extortion is coercive.
14 4
142 See NOONAN, supra note 6, cited in Evans, 112 S. Ct. at 1896 n.2 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
143 See Ruff, supra note 19, cited in Evans, 112 S. Ct. at 1896 n.2 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
144 Here is the entire text of Ruff's history of common law extortion:
Blackstone described the crime of extortion as "an abuse of public
justice, which consists in an officer's unlawfully taking, by colour of his
office, from any man, any money or thing of value, that is not due him, or
more than is due, or before it is due." The historical roots of this offense
may be traced to the Roman leges repetundarum, which, beginning in 171
B.C., prohibited magistrates and, later, other public officials from profiting
by their positions. A comparable offense appeared in England as early as
1275. Chapter 26 of the Statute of Westminster I, entitled "Extortion by the
King's Officers," provided in part that "no Sheriff, nor other the King's
Officer, take any reward to do his Office, but shall be paid of that which
they take of the King; and he that so doth, shall yield twice as much, and
shall be punished at the King's Pleasure." The bulk of this statute still
remains in force, although its specific references to sheriff and coroners
have been recodified in other legislation.
The earliest recorded decision interpreting the extortion provision of
the Statute of Westminster I arose in the context of a civil suit by Lewis
Dive, sheriff of Bedford, against John Maningham in the amount of £40,
representing a bond for the release pending trial of a prisoner in the
sheriff's custody. In finding for the defendant, ChiefJustice Mountague
concluded, in part, that the plaintiff had demanded payment improperly
colore officii and stated:
[For] this Word colore officii sui is always taken in malem partem,
and signifies an Act badly done under the Countenance of an
Office, and it bears a dissembling Visage of Duty, and is properly
called Extortion. As if an Officer will take more for his Fees than
he ought, this is done colore officii sui, but yet it is not Part of his
Office, and it is called Extortion, which is no other than Robbery,
but it is more odious than Robbery, for Robbery is apparent, and
always hath the Countenance of Vice, but Extortion, being equally
as great a Vice as Robbery, carries the Mask of Virtue, and is more
difficult to be tried or discerned, and consequently more odious
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than Robbery.
Ruff, supra note 19, at 1179-80 (footnotes omitted).
Ruff's first sentence merely quotes Blackstone, whose definition contains no
demand requirement, no initiation requirement, and no coercion requirement.
Further, the definition is broad enough on its face to cover noncoercive bribery
behavior, because bribery is an unlawful taking, by color of office, of property not
due the officer.
Ruff's second sentence discusses a Roman statute, which Ruffs footnote makes
clear forbade all gifts, whether given voluntarily, or under duress.
The third sentence quotes chapter 26 of the First Statute of Westminster, which
was the main English extortion statute for most of the last 700 years and which was
frequently said to be merely declarative of the common law. It covers taking a reward
to do one's office and says nothing about a demand, inducement, or coercion.
Within a few decades of Westminster I, it was made clear that taking a reward not to
do one's office was also extortion. The legislative history of the statute also indicates
that it was intended to get at bribery behavior. Further, Ruff says that this basic
extortion statute was a "comparable offense" to the Roman statute, a law that
prohibited gifts, whether voluntary or coerced. See Statute of Westminster 1, 3 Edw.
I, c. 26 (1275); see also 3 COKE, FIRST INSTITUTE, supra note 120, at 541; 3J. CHFITY,
A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 293 n.w (1832); Lindgren, supra note
4, at 841-48 (discussing origins of statute); 5 YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD II, 1 THE EYRE
OF KENT, 6 & 7 EDWARD 11143 (F. Maitland et al. eds., 1910) (reporting inquest of
1313-14).
Ruff's fourth sentence incorrectly states that this section of Westminster I is still
in force, but the citation in his footnote correctly lists the statute as repealed in 1968.
Ruff's fifth sentence introduces the Dive case from 1550. Dive v. Maningham,
1 Plowd. 60, 75 Eng. Rep. 96 (C.B. 1550).
The sixth and seventh sentences are mostly a quotation from Dive. Dive is often
cited but seldom understood. See supra notes 133-36. First, Ruff incorrectly states
that Dive is the earliest reported decision interpreting the extortion provision of
Westminster I. On the contrary, Dive never mentions Westminster I, but rather
concerns itself with a later extortion statute. See 23 Henry 6, c. 10 (1444). Second,
Dive is not an extortion case, but instead an action on a bond. Third, the extortion
statute in Dive was described in the opinion itself as havingbeen designed to prevent
"bribery." A statute that prevents bribery would not normally be limited to situations
of demands, coercion, or initiation by the official. Fourth, the behavior called
extortion in the case appears to be behavior that we would today also call bribery.
A sheriff accepted a bond to let a prisoner out on bail when he was required by law
to keep him in jail. The prisoner got more than fair treatment in return for a
promise to pay. Fifth, the case says nothing about a demand requirement or about
an initiation requirement.
While the case doesn't say that extortion is coercive, in obviously hyperbolic dicta
it does liken extortion to robbery. But this doesn't distinguish extortion from bribery
because particularly at the time, bribery was also likened to robbery. Indeed, in the
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY [hereinafter OED] the first definition of the noun bribe
is "theft, robbery." 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1092 (1st ed. 1928). The first
definition of the verb bribe is "to steal, rob; to obtain by... extortion; to extort." 1
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1092 (1st ed. 1928). The OED gives an example from
1461 tying together robbery, bribery, and color of office: "To lette brybers that wold
a robbed a ship undyr color of my Lord of Warwyk." Id. Because the crime of
bribery was just being created in the mid-1500s and it appears not to have applied to
administrative officials then, the comparison with robbery perhaps was intended to
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Justice Thomas also cites John Noonan's Bribes as if it were a
competing history of extortion. Noonan's monumental 839-page
book is even less of a legal history of extortion than Ruff's. In fact,
I could find only five sentences in the book discussing the history
of extortion at common law.145 Noonan cites three authorities
make it easier to punish bribery behavior as extortion.
Thus the judicial speechifying in Dive wasn't meant to distinguish extortion from
bribery. Everything said about extortion in Dive is consistent with bribery and
extortion being overlapping crimes committed without coercion or demand. The
only thing that could have been called coercive in Dive was that the sheriffwould have
kept the prisoner in jail where he belonged if his brother hadn't promised to pay a
bribe to get out of jail. Dive is evidence that at common law bribing a jailer was
extortion.
Ruff's brief history of common law extortion doesn't make any sweeping
conclusions about demand, initiation, or coercion. In fact, if he hadn't made other
statements later in his article, I couldn't have guessed where he stood on the
supposed coercion requirement, demand requirement, or the bribery-extortion
overlap. His history of common law extortion doesn't cite a single actual extortion
case. The four authorities Ruff discusses in text all support the inclusion of bribery
behavior within extortion and use language that is broad enough to cover the passive
receipt of a bribe as extortion. Neither Ruff, nor any authority he cites in his history,
says that extortion at common law required a demand, initiation, or coercion.
Yet, Ruff criticizesJudge Minton for arguing that at common law "color of public
office took the place of the force, threats, or pressure implied in the ordinary
meaning and understanding of the word extortion." Ruff, supra note 19, at 1182,
quoting United States v. Sutter, 160 F.2d 754, 756 (7th Cir. 1947). Ruff says that
Minton's explanation is "wholly at odds with the true common law origins of the
offense." Id. What true origins? Ruff never says. He fails to explain the problem
with Minton's statement. Nothing Ruff said earlier about common law extortion was
in conflict with Minton's characterization. His handful of common law historical
authorities point in the opposite direction from his oblique criticism of Minton.
145 John Noonan's Bribes contains only five sentences on the history of extortion
at common law. (1) "Extortion would have required a showing of coercion which the
managers of the impeachment [of Warren Hastings] did not attempt." NOONAN,
supra note 6, at 398 (referring to the Warren Hastings case). (2-3) "At the core of
[Stern's] article was the contention that 'extortion' under color of official right was
equivalent to bribery. Blackstone's definition of extortion, he asserted, supported this
position." Id. at 585 (citing Stern, supra note 19, at 14-15). (4) "Stern's contention
that Blackstone supported his interpretation was substantively inaccurate." NooNAN,
supra at 586. (5) "[T]he court in Kenny ignored Blackstone." Id. (referring to United
States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972)).
The first sentence says that extortion required coercion, but he cites no support
and the Hastings indictment itself equated bribery with extortion, a fact that
prompted Noonan's contrary claim.
The second and third sentences merely describe Stern's claims, which supported
the overlap of bribery and extortion. Noonan's fourth sentence says that Blackstone
didn't support Stern, but Noonan doesn't explain why. Contrary to the implications
ofNoonan's claim, Blackstone describes extortion in language that seems to embrace
bribery behavior and says nothing about coercion, a demand requirement, or an
initiation requirement. The fifth sentence likewise says that the Kenny case ignored
Blackstone but doesn't explain why Kenny and Blackstone are inconsistent. The
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with whom he disagrees because they treat bribery behavior as
extortion, but these authorities all undercut his position. 146 He
offers no affirmative support for his view that extortion at common
law was limited to coercion.
Further, despite the fact that Bribes is the only significant history
of bribery and one of the best criminal histories ever written,
Noonan's social and literary history is generally much stronger than
his legal analysis. Noonan's blind spot on extortion mars what is
otherwise a great book. It causes him to miss the fact that the first
English bribery statutes are really offshoots of extortion (i.e.,
extortion statutes that apply to judges), to argue incorrectly that
"color of office" wasn't part of bribery, to misunderstand one of his
main cases (the Warren Hastings case), to miss by at least 500 years
the first clear prosecutions of bribery behavior by administrative
officials, 147 and to mischaracterize the modern Hobbs Act dis-
pute.
interesting thing about these statements is that they are all really disagreements with
the authorities being discussed. Noonan is saying that the Hastings case, Stern, and
the Kenny case were wrong to include bribery behavior within the crime of extortion.
He is disagreeing with the authorities he is presenting-certainly a historian's
prerogative. But where is the positive proof that extortion was as Noonan says it was,
not as the authorities he cites say it was? Far from supporting Noonan's opinions, the
authorities discussed actually point in the opposite direction. He says they are wrong.
But why? In Bribes, he never says.
That's Noonan's brief competing history of common law extortion. No common
law extortion cases are mentioned. The only old case mentioned is Hastings, which
is a case strongly showing the overlap of bribery and extortion. Noonan discusses
Hastings as if it were a bribery case, but he admits that the charge was actually
"extortion," not bribery. See NOONAN, supra note 6, at 398.
146 See NOONAN, supra note 6, at 398, 585 & 586.
147 See Lindgren, supra note 4, at 858-61 (discussing dozens of thirteenth-century
cases charging or punishing bribery behavior by administrative officials, mostly as
extortion). Noonan argued: "In 1600 only judges and witnesses could be criminally
bribed, that is, found guilty of a crime for taking money to be influenced. By the
eighteenth century the impeachment of Warren Hastings at least acknowledged that
administrators fell within a class that could commit the crime." NOONAN, supra note
6, at 579. In the particular charge Noonan discusses at length, however, Hastings was
prosecuted for extortion, not bribery (as Noonan himself notes). See HOUSE OF
COMMONS, Articles of Impeachment, in HOUSE OF LORDs SESSIONAL PAPERS 1794-1795,
at 34-36 (F. Torrington ed., 1974).
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C. The Quid Pro Quo Requirement
In McCormick, Justice White announced an explicit quid pro quo
requirement in campaign contribution cases 148 and was silent
about corrupt intent, perhaps under the mistaken belief that the
quid pro quo requirement could supplant an inquiry into corrup-
tion. In Evans, Justice Stevens extended a watered-down version of
the quid pro quo requirement to all official extortion under the
Hobbs Act,149 and Justice Kennedy emphasized the necessity of
corrupt intent.1 50 Although the differences in language between
McCormick and Evans are subtle, their practical effect is stark. I
believe that, whereas the Stevens and Kennedy approaches are
workable, Justice White's explicit quid pro quo requirement is not.
1. Justice White's Explicit Quid Pro Quo Requirement
One problem with Justice White's approach is its literalness. If
you can prove a quid pro quo beyond a reasonable doubt, why
should you also have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
quid pro quo is explicit? Why have a formalities requirement for
extortion like a will or a deed of land? In wills and deeds, having
a requirement of explicitness channels people to make their deals
more explicit, 151 channeling behavior in socially useful ways. In
addition, exchangers already have an incentive to make deals
explicit in order to make them enforceable in court. But in the
criminal law, explicitness channels criminals to make their deals less
explicit, channeling behavior in socially detrimental ways. Even
without Justice White's innovation, the incentives already lead
crooks to make their deals less explicit, since enforcement in court
is never desired. Justice Kennedy insightfully argues:
The official and the payor need not state the quid pro quo in
express terms, for otherwise the law's effect could be frustrated by
knowing winks and nods. The inducement from the official is
criminal if it is express or if it is implied from his words and
148 See McCormick v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1807, 1815 (1991).
149 See Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1889 (1992).
150 See id. at 1892 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
151 See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 801-03
(1941) (recognizing the channeling function); John H. Langbein, Sunstantial
Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARv. L. REV. 489, 493-94 (1975) (discussing the
channeling function);James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirementsfor Wills,
68 N.C. L. REv. 541, 544 (1990) (same).
17331993]
1734 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:1695
actions, so long as he intends it to be so and the payor so
interprets it.
The criminal law in the usual course concerns itself with
motives and consequences, not formalities. And the trier of fact is
quite capable of deciding the intent with which words were spoken
or actions taken as well as the reasonable construction given to
them by the official and the payor1
52
Justice White's explicitness requirement is perverse and isn't directly
mentioned in the Evans case.
Justice White seems to think that corrupt officials act like the
killers in movie and television murder mysteries. In the last few
minutes of most hack mysteries, the villain pauses before murdering
the clever detective to explain to the detective how and why he
killed; this pause not only allows the detective to escape the killer's
evil clutches, but it makes explicit to the audience what happened.
But in government corruption, only idiots or targets of government
stings are likely to make things explicit. That's not how things are
usually done.153  As Noonan notes, "[d]ealing with intelligent
donees, the donor may reasonably expect a better return if he is not
specific."
154
Justice White commits what I call the Lawyer's Fallacy,
155
named by analogy to the Psychologist's Fallacy and the Historian's
Fallacy. The Lawyer's Fallacy assumes that people understand what
they do, while they do it, from the perspective of a lawyer or that
people act as if they are creating evidence for lawyers to find later.
It sees people cooperatively climbing into pigeonholes where
lawyers can easily find them.
2. The Stevens Approach to the Quid Pro Quo Requirement
Except when detailing the defendant's claim, Justice Stevens's
majority opinion in Evans mentions a quid pro quo requirement in
only one paragraph, where it also sets out its summary of the law of
the case:
We reject petitioner's criticism of the instruction, and
conclude that it satisfies the quid pro quo requirement of McCor-
mick v. United States... because the offense is completed at the
152 Id.
153 Prosecutors have long pointed out the subtlety of public officials' shaking
down citizens. See supra note 19.
154 NOONAN, supra note 6, at 687.
155 SeeJames Lindgren, The Lawyer's Fallacy, 68 CHI.KENT L. REv. 109 (1992).
BRIBERY-EXTORTION DISTINCTION
time when the public official receives a payment in return for his
agreement to perform specific official acts; fulfillment of the quid
pro quo is not an element of the offense. We also reject petition-
er's contention that an affirmative step is an element of the
offense of extortion "under color of official right" and need be
included in the instruction. As we explained above, our construc-
tion of the statute is informed by the common-law tradition from
which the term of art was drawn and understood. We hold today
that the Government need only show that a public official has obtained a
payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made
in return for official acts1 56
Is this a quid pro quo requirement or not? Justice Thomas's dissent
characterizes it as such, but Justice Kennedy's concurrence treats
the majority opinion as presenting the quid pro quo as "an
alternative rationale." 157 Although the quid pro quo requirement
is mentioned and the McCormick case is harmonized, I believe that
a jury instruction following Evans should be based on the last
sentence, rather than the words quid pro quo. Note that the
language doesn't require any actual agreement or intent to take any
official act; what's required is the receipt of a payment knowing it
was made in return for official acts. At several points in his
discussion, Justice Stevens describes extortion as corrupt, but he
doesn't make that element a clear part of his analysis.
3. The Kennedy Approach to the Quid Pro Quo Requirement
Justice Kennedy argues for a position similar to Justice Stevens's,
but he embraces a slightly stronger quid pro quo element:
Although the Court appears to accept the requirement of a quid
pro quo as an alternative rationale, in my view this element of the
offense is essential to a determination of those acts which are
criminal and those which are not in a case in which the official
does not pretend that he is entitled by law to the property in
question.
The requirement of a quid pro quo means that without pretense
of any entitlement to the payment, a public official violates § 1951
if he intends the payor to believe that absent payment the official
is likely to abuse his office and his trust to the detriment and
injury of the prospective payor or to give the prospective payor
156 Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1889 (1992) (emphasis added).
15 7 Id. at 1892 (Kennedy, J, concurring).
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less favorable treatment if the quid pro quo is not satisfied. The
official and the payor need not state the quid pro quo in express
terms .... 158
Justice Kennedy also argues that "motive is crucial"1 59 and that "a
public official who labors under the good-faith but erroneous belief
that he is entitled to payment for an official act does not violate the
statute."
160
4. Quid Pro Quos Aren't Necessarily Corrupt
I suspect that most of the continuing difficulties in the use of
the Hobbs Act against public corruption will stem from two sources:
(1) How explicit must the understanding be?; and (2) What should
be done about quid pro quos that may not be corrupt enough to be
called extortion?
The problem that the Court is trying to solve is that elected
officials often receive contributions from people with pending
government business. Such contributions aren't necessarily corrupt.
The old way to separate corrupt takings from noncorrupt contribu-
tions was to ask the ultimate question: Are they corrupt or
wrongful? It appears that the Court thinks that a quid pro quo
requirement does the same job separating wrongful takings from
legitimate contributions. But does it?
Consider these explicit quid pro quos that aren't corrupt (or at
least aren't corrupt enough to count as official extortion):
(1) A legislator says to a trucking company owner, "If you make
this large contribution to my campaign, I promise you three
things. First, I won't vote on any trucking legislation without
calling you first. Second, when you call me, I will drop whatever
official business I am doing to take your call personally. Third,
when you or your clients come to town, I will rearrange my
schedule whenever possible to entertain you in the legislative
dining room. I can't promise you how I'll vote, but you can buy
what any large contributor buys: direct access to me."
(2) A legislator says to a large contributor, "If you give me a large
contribution, I'll consult you on my choice of my next chief of
staff. Understand me, he'll be working for me, not you. But I
promise you that I'll pick someone you can work with."
158 Id.
159 Id. at 1893 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
160 Id. at 1894 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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The contributor gets an explicit quid pro quo-access to the
legislator or consultation on a staff appointment. Someone with
very high ethical standards may view these last two examples as
corrupt, but the Supreme Court probably wouldn't. Indeed, the
legislators' willingness to state the deals clearly suggests that they
wouldn't think they are corrupt. Yet both situations might meet
Justices White's, Stevens's, and Kennedy's reciprocity tests, at least
without a specific filter that the agreements be corrupt. Only by
bringing in the corrupt intent element mentioned by Justice Stevens
and embraced by Justice Kennedy can a jury make sense of these
examples. Thus, if these examples don't involve obtaining property
corruptly or wrongfully, even an explicit quid pro quo isn't enough
for extortion.
But then, what does the explicit quid pro quo requirement add
other than noise? If one must test extortion by whether it's corrupt
in any event, a reciprocity requirement only adds another layer that
may exculpate those otherwise guilty of wrongful extortion. The
nature of the exchange must be examined in any event.
The obvious objection to relying on the corruption requirement
alone is its vagueness. A quid pro quo requirement will give better
notice than a simple corruption requirement. Anytime you're
dealing with behavior as complex as promises and threats, you can't
nail down every possible permutation in advance. The best
approach is to use judicial decisionmaking to clarify ambiguities and
give guidance to triers of fact. Evans does this by requiring
reciprocity.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit tried a softer, more
nuanced approach in its McCormick opinion.161 It set out these
criteria for distinguishing a corrupt campaign contribution from
extortion:
Some of the circumstances that should be considered in making
this determination include, but are not limited to, (1) whether the
money was recorded by the payor as a campaign contribution, (2)
whether the money was recorded and reported by the official as
a campaign contribution, (3) whether the payment was in cash, (4)
whether it was delivered to the official personally or to his
campaign, (5) whether the official acted in his official capacity at
or near the time of the payment for the benefit of the payor or
supported legislation that would benefit the payor, (6) whether the
161 McCormick v. United States, 896 F.2d 61, 66 (4th Cir. 1990), revd, 111 S. Ct.
1807 (1991).
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official had supported similar legislation before the time of the
payment, and (7) whether the official had directly or indirectly
solicited the payor individually for the payment.1
62
In particular, large cash payments not properly recorded are a tipoff
that something is very likely wrong. The Supreme Court in
McCormick rejected these criteria,16- although they seem fairly
sensible. Certainly, they're preferable to McCormick's perverse
explicitness requirement. In Evans, the Court has moved away from
an explicit quid pro quo to a much less strict reciprocity require-
ment. While not required by the legislative history of the Hobbs
Act or the common law history of extortion, Evans' reciprocity
requirement does limit the statute to the most common and easily
prosecuted form of serious corruption: "a public official [who] has
obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the
payment was made in return for official acts."
164
CONCLUSION
Occasionally over the last 150 years, lawyers have tried to
distinguish bribery and extortion in some way that would keep the
two crimes entirely separate. But at almost every turn, they have
been thwarted-with good reason. The overlap of bribery and
extortion can be accounted for theoretically, historically, and
pragmatically.
The theoretical overlap between bribery on the one hand, and
blackmail and extortion on the other, becomes clear if one adopts
my theory of blackmail. Both crimes involve the misuse of a
representative power for personal gain-even if that representative
power is not always formalized in blackmail situations. When
someone threatens a prostitute to cause her to be arrested unless
she pays the threatener to keep quiet, it matters little to the law of
blackmail or extortion whether the threatener is a private citizen or
a public official. Either would be using fear of the state and the
public (i.e., state or public leverage) for personal gain. If either
received a payoff not to testify or prosecute, he would also be guilty
of receiving a bribe. Again, he would be trading on state leverage
for personal gain. In my view, both bribery and blackmail are
grounded in a similar wrong.
162 Id. at 66.
163 See McCormick, 111 S. Ct. at 1807.
164 Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1889 (1992).
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The historical overlap arose because the crime of bribery
developed relatively late, perhaps not being routinely applied to
administrative officials until the 1800s. Since the 1200s extortion
filled the gap, covering acquisitions by bribery behavior, false
pretenses, and coercion. The first English statutes that later were
considered bribery statutes were essentially extortion statutes that
applied to judges. Bribery was thus an offshoot of extortion, and
most bribery situations remained within the sphere of official
extortion at common law. Roughly, bribery involved payments that
were corrupt to make (and to receive), while extortion involved
payments that were corrupt to receive.
The pragmatic benefit of recognizing an overlap can be gleaned
from looking at the parts of the story already told-the theory and
the history. If one adopts some unwise distinction, such as that
bribery is voluntary while extortion is coercive or that in bribery the
citizen makes the first approach, it's exceedingly difficult for a
judge, jury, or prosecutor to know how to separate the crimes.
Most payoff situations involve both a threat of the possibility of
worse than fair treatment (core extortion) and the promise of
unfairly positive treatment (core bribery). The bribery-extortion
distinction is not a typical case of difficult legal line-drawing.
Bribery and extortion don't approach each other at their edges.
They overlap at their cores.
Where the law or fairness doesn't require separating the two
crimes for public officials, it's not practical to do so. The historical
meanings should be respected and the courts should try to proceed
to clarify the crimes so as to give defendants fair notice of what's
prohibited. That's what the Court seems to be doing with its
opinion in Evans: bribery and extortion overlap; no act of induce-
ment is required; and the Government "need only show that a
public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled,
knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts."
165
A discordant note is sounded in Justice Thomas's dissenting
opinion in Evans. Not only does Justice Thomas angrily accuse his
colleagues of making up the law,166 but he argues that it was
settled law that official extortion was limited to a pretense that the
payment was owed. As Justice Stevens points out, however, Justice
Thomas is unable to come up with a single case where an official
165 Id.
6 See id. at 1897 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also supra note 68 and accompany-
ing text.
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was found innocent of official extortion because he didn't trick the
citizen into paying. 167 Justice Thomas has clearly misread most
of the cases he cites. In two of these cases,168 the court explicitly
rejected Justice Thomas's argument, holding that a pretense of
official entitlement was not required for official extortion.
Justice Thomas further argues that what distinguishes extortion
from bribery is that extortion required a taking under "color of
office," while bribery didn't. In particular, he complains about the
Evans majority's heavy reliance on my work and claims that I fail to
account adequately for the "color of office" requirement.169
Although in an earlier article, I had given considerable evidence of
the meaning of color of office at common law, I had mentioned
only in passing its role in bribery cases. 170 Yet, since the Hobbs
Act debate arose in 1972, no judge or academic commentator had
claimed that official extortion was limited to false pretenses-until
Justices Scalia in McCormick and Thomas in Evans. In this Article,
I show that from the earliest discussions of the crime of bribery in
the common law treatises (Coke and Hawkins) through the
twentieth century, bribery has been understood as a "color of
office" offense. Indeed, takings by color of office refer to the core
of bribery behavior, payments to distort official action. Color of
office has been called "the essence of the crime" of bribery.
171
Rather than distinguishing extortion from bribery, the traditional
"color of office" language links the two offenses.
For as long as there have been governments, there has been
corruption. To prosecute corruption fairly, legislatures and courts
must give notice of what's prohibited and what's not. In Evans, the
United States Supreme Court has gone a long way toward settling
an interpretive problem that has plagued American extortion
jurisprudence for over a century. But let's not fool ourselves: the
debate is not over. It will merely shift from those questions that are
newly answered to the remaining mysteries of the law of extortion.
167 See id. at 1890.
168 Dean v. State, 71 S.E. 597, 598 (Ga. Ct. App. 1911); Hanley v. State, 104 N.W.
57 (Wis. 1905).16 9 Evans, 112 S. Ct. at 1895 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
170 Lindgren, supra note 133.
171 State v. Hendricks, 186 P.2d 943, 947 (Ariz. 1947) (quoting 1 BURDICK, LAW
OF CRIME § 291).
